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Abstract: We investigate the Weihrauch-degree of several solution concepts from non-
cooperative game theory. While the consideration of Nash equilibria forms the core of
our work, also pure and correlated equilibria, as well as various concepts of iterated
strategy elimination, are dealt with. As a side result, the Weihrauch-degree of solving
systems of linear inequalities is settled.
Key Words: Game Theory, Computable Analysis, Nash Equilibrium, Discontinuity,
Weihrauch-degree
Category: F.2.0
1 Introduction
The present paper can be understood in two diﬀerent ways: From one point of
view, it contributes to the ﬁeld of Algorithmic Game Theory by studying the
natural algorithmic problems arising from game theory in a framework for real
number computation. Alternatively, it classiﬁes the ineﬀective content of Nash’s
Theorem asserting the existence of Nash equilibria in a meta-mathematical
framework.
While a natural mathematical formulation of game theory uses the real
numbers for payoﬀs and for probabilities constituting mixed strategies, clas-
sical models for algorithms require a restriction to countable sets. By imposing
certain restrictions and modiﬁcations to obtain countable problems, the complex-
ity of computing a Nash equilibrium for a normal form game was proven to be
PPAD-complete ([Papadimitriou (1994)], [Chen and Deng (2005)]). In
[Gilboa and Zemel (1989)] several decision problems regarding Nash equilibria
and correlated equilibria were compared, most of them turned out to be NP-hard
for Nash equilibria and to be in P for correlated equilibria. Finding pure equi-
libria in normal form games where they exist, can be done by a cubic algorithm.
However, there are several interesting hardness results for ﬁnding pure equilibria
in games ([Gottlob et al. (2005)], [Fabrikant et al. (2004)]), originating in other
representations or requiring additional properties.
Here we will use another approach: Instead of limiting the problem, we will
extend the theory of computation. While the TTE-framework [Weihrauch (2000)]
is perfectly capable of formulating the task of computing Nash equilibria from
normal form games, we will see that even the most trivial cases are discontin-
uous, and hence not computable. The relation of relative computability for the
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TTE-framework is Weihrauch-reducibility ([Pauly (2009c)]), which goes back to
[Weihrauch (1992b)]. So by classifying the Weihrauch-degree of ﬁnding Nash
equilibria, we identify the smallest extension to the notion of computability suf-
ﬁcient to render ﬁnding Nash equilibria eﬀective.
As proposed in [Brattka and Gherardi (2009a)], Weihrauch-reducibility of-
fers an excellent framework for meta-mathematical studies, similar to, but dis-
tinct from approaches such as reverse mathematics. In [Pauly (2010)] and
[Brattka and Gherardi (2009b)] it was demonstrated that the Weihrauch-degrees
form a bounded distributive lattice.
We will show that ﬁnding pure equilibria (where they exist) form the sim-
plest Weihrauch-degree of the studied solution concepts. Nash equilibria and
correlated equilibria share a strictly harder Weihrauch-degree, while all notions
of iterated strategy elimination induce a third degree, strictly harder than the
previous one. None of the problems becomes easier by restriction to zero-sum
games, in contrast to the classical scenario.
A previous version of the present paper appeared as [Pauly (2009b)], where
continuous reductions were used instead of computable ones, thereby yielding
weaker results.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Game Theory
An n×m bi-matrix game is given by two n×m real valued matrices A and B.
Two players simultaneously pick an index, row player chooses an i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
and column player chooses an j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Row player gets Aij as a re-
ward, column player gets Bij . We consider several solution concepts deﬁned as
equilibria, where no player has an incentive to change her strategy unilaterally.
Other types of solution concepts are brieﬂy deﬁned and explored in Subsection
5.2.
Definition 1. A pure equilibrium for a n ×m bi-matrix game (A,B) is a pair
(i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . ,m} satisfying Aij ≥ Akj for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
Bij ≥ Bil for all l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
As pure equilibria do not exist for all games, a more general notion is intro-
duced. If both players can randomize independently over their actions, one is led
to the deﬁnition of an m-mixed strategy as an m-dimensional real valued vector
s with non-negative coeﬃcients and
m∑
j=1
sj = 1. The set of m-mixed strategies
will be denoted by Sm.
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Definition 2. A Nash equilibrium for an n×m bi-matrix game (A,B) is a pair
(xˆ, yˆ) ∈ Sn × Sm satisfying xˆTAyˆ ≥ xTAyˆ for all x ∈ Sn and xˆTByˆ ≥ xˆTBy for
all y ∈ Sm.
If (xˆ, yˆ) is a Nash equilibrium, again neither of the players can improve her
payoﬀ by changing her mixed strategy unilaterally. A famous result by John
Nash ([Nash (1950)]) established that Nash equilibria in bi-matrix games always
exist. By identifying a pure strategy with the mixed strategy that puts weight 1
on it, pure equilibria can be considered as a special case of Nash equilibria. An
even more general solution concept can be obtained by allowing the individual
players’ randomization processes to be correlated ([Aumann (1974)]).
Definition 3. A correlated equilibrium for a n×m bi-matrix game (A,B) is a
real valued n×m matrix C with non-negative entries and
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Cij = 1 so that
m∑
j=1
AijCij ≥
m∑
j=1
AljCij
holds for all i, l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and
n∑
i=1
BijCij ≥
n∑
i=1
BikCij
holds for all j, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
Given a Nash equilibrium (x, y), a correlated equilibrium can be constructed
as Cij = xiyj, while each correlated equilibrium of this form can be obtained
from a Nash equilibrium, allowing us to consider Nash equilibria as special cases
of correlated equilibria. Thus, ﬁnding a correlated equilibrium cannot be harder
than ﬁnding a Nash equilibrium.
Another way of creating a potentially easier problem consists in a restriction
of the games used. A zero-sum game is a bi-matrix game of the form (A,−A).
2.2 Representing Games
In order to consider games as inputs to Type-2-Machines, they have to be coded
into inﬁnite sequences. The choice of the countable alphabet used is irrelevant
for the theory, to simplify proofs we will use either {0, 1} or N, depending on
the context.
Definition 4. A representation of a set X is a surjective partial function δ :⊆
NN → X . A set together with a representation of it is called a represented space.
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Using representations, we can introduce realizers : a realizer will produce
a name of a solution given a name of an instance for the associated problem.
They also give a straightforward way to consider multi-valued functions, which is
necessary, as games can have multiple equilibria. While multi-valuedness will be
mentioned explicitly wherever it applies, all (multi-valued) functions are assumed
to be partial, as long as not stated otherwise.
Definition 5. Let f be a multi-valued function between two represented spaces
(X, δX) and (Y, δY ). Then we call a function F :⊆ NN → NN a realizer of f
(F  f), if δY (F (w)) ∈ f(δX(w)) holds for all w ∈ dom(f ◦ δX).
As games in normal form are pairs of real matrices, and (possible) equilibria
pairs of real vectors (or again real matrices), one can quickly derive suitable rep-
resentations by using product and coproduct representations [Weihrauch (2000)],
starting from any representation of the real numbers.
Definition 6. Given two represented spaces (X1, δ1) and (X2, δ2), deﬁne the
representation 〈δ1, δ2〉 of the setX1×X2 by 〈δ1, δ2〉(〈w1, w2〉) = (δ1(w1), δ2(w2)).
Here 〈w1, w2〉 denotes the usual pairing of sequences.
Definition 7. Given a family (Xi, δi)i∈N of represented spaces, we deﬁne the
coproduct representation
∐
i∈N
δi of the disjoint union
∐
i∈N
Xi by
[∐
i∈N
δi
]
(nw) =
(n, δn(w)).
The standard representation ρ of the real numbers is chosen for various rea-
sons; it is admissible and provides a convincing class of computable functions, in
contrast to some of the alternatives ([Weihrauch (2000)], [Weihrauch (1992a)]).
Additionally, as demonstrated in [Pauly (2009d)], the representation ρ is equiv-
alent to the representation naturally arising for the results of repeated physical
measurements. For deﬁning ρ, we ﬁx a bijection ν : N → Q with ν(0) = 0, so
that all the usual operations on Q are computable w.r.t. ν.
Definition 8. Let ρ(w) = x ∈ R hold for w ∈ NN, if |ν(w(i)) − x| ≤ 2−i holds
for all i ∈ N.
As all the representations used in the present paper are admissible, topolog-
ical properties carry over from sets of objects to sets of names of said objects.
We avoid constructing the needed representations explicitly, up to equivalence
it is clear which one is used.
2.3 Weihrauch-degrees
The present form of Weihrauch-reducibility was suggested in
[Brattka and Gherardi (2009b)], derived from a concept originally introduced in
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[Weihrauch (1992b)]. It is deﬁned based on the sets of realizers of the involved
functions, and can be interpreted as relative computability.
Definition 9. Let f and g be multi-valued functions between represented spaces.
Deﬁne f ≤W g, if there are computable functions F ,G satisfying F◦〈id, r◦G〉  f
for all r  g.
As demonstrated in [Pauly (2010)] (for suprema) and
[Brattka and Gherardi (2009b)] (for inﬁma), ≤W induces a distributive lattice.
In the following, we introduce two basic operations on Weihrauch degrees, prod-
ucts and coproducts. The latter agree with suprema in the ﬁnite case. While
the deﬁnitions make use of representatives of the actual Weihrauch-degrees, we
assert that the resulting Weihrauch-degrees do not depend on the choice of the
representatives1.
Definition 10. Let f :⊆ (X1, αX) → (Y1, αY ) and g :⊆ (X2, βX) → (Y2, βY ) be
multi-valued functions between represented spaces. Deﬁne
〈f, g〉 :⊆ (X1 ×X2, 〈αX , βX〉) → (Y1 × Y2, 〈αY , βY 〉)
by (y1, y2) ∈ 〈f, g〉(x1, x2), if y1 ∈ f(x1) and y2 ∈ g(x2).
Definition 11. Let (fi :⊆ (Xi, αi) → (Yi, βi))i∈N be a countable family of multi-
valued functions between represented spaces. Deﬁne∐
i∈N
fi :⊆ (
∐
i∈N
Xi,
∐
i∈N
αi) → (
∐
i∈N
Yi,
∐
i∈N
βi)
by (i, y) ∈
( ∐
k∈N
fk
)
(j, x), if i = j and y ∈ fi(x).
The deﬁnitions of products can be extended to any ﬁnite arity. We will use
fn to denote the product of n copies of f . Restriction of the coproduct to ﬁnitely
many arguments yields f
∐
g ≤W 〈f, g〉, provided that the domains of f and g
contain computable points [Brattka et al. (2010)]. Of particular importance is
the ¯-operator introduced in [Pauly (2010), Subsection 6.1], as we will classify
the Weihrauch-degrees we are interested in in terms of the ¯-operator applied
to certain simple problems.
Definition 12. For a multi-valued function f , deﬁne f¯ by f¯ =
∐
n∈N
fn.
The ¯-operator is a closure-operator for Weihrauch-reducibility, as shown in
[Pauly (2010), Theorem 6.5]:
1 For products, this is the statement of [Brattka and Gherardi (2009b), Proposition
3.2].
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Theorem 13. satisfies the following properties:
1. f ≤W f
2. f ≤W g implies f ≤W g
3. f ≡W f
The same technique used to prove the 3. result above also yields the following
lemma, which will be relevant later:
Lemma14. Let fn be a family of multi-valued functions, so that there is a
computable function λ : N × N → N, so that the reduction 〈fn, fm〉 ≤W fλ(n,m)
holds uniformly for all n,m ∈ N. Then ∐
n∈N
fn ≡W
( ∐
n∈N
fn
)
.
The negative results regarding Weihrauch-reducibility appearing in the
present paper rely on continuity arguments. Since this makes them stronger
than negative results for computability, we introduce continuous Weihrauch-
reducibility:
Definition 15. Let f ,g be multi-valued functions between represented spaces.
Deﬁne f ≤cW g, if there are continuous functions F , G satisfying F ◦〈id, r◦G〉  f
for all r  g.
Moving from computable to continuous functions essentially is relativizing
with respect to an arbitrary classical oracle. We note that the results stated in
this subsection for Weihrauch-reducibility carry over to continuous Weihrauch-
reducibility. Obviously, Weihrauch-reducibility implies continuous Weihrauch-
reducibility, while the converse is false.
Finally, note that coproduct representations and coproducts of multi-valued
functions are closely linked. Especially, the dimension-independent versions of
the problems studied here are always the coproducts of the dimension-dependent
variant over all possible dimensions.
3 Single Player Games and Pure Equilibria
From the perspective of game theory, single player games are trivial: The acting
player chooses whatever action is best for her. As a discrete computation prob-
lem, this amounts to ﬁnding a maximum in a list of integers, a task that can be
solved in linear time or logarithmic space. As the problem posed over the reals
is discontinuous, we will study the problems 1Puren and 1Pure of ﬁnding pure
equilibria in single player games with n actions, and without ﬁxed game sizes.
It shall be noted that single player games can be identiﬁed with n× 1 bi-matrix
games, justifying their inclusion.
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As every n × 1 bi-matrix game has a pure equilibrium, and Ci1 > 0 can
only hold in a correlated equilibrium C, if the entry Ai1 is maximal in A (and
thus (i, 1) is a pure equilibrium), ﬁnding pure, Nash and correlated equilibria is
equivalent for single player games, so the restriction to pure equilibria does not
invoke any loss of generality.
The Weihrauch-degrees of 1Puren for n ∈ N turn out to be equivalent
to another family of problems, MLPOn, introduced in [Weihrauch (1992b)] as
generalizations of the lesser limited principle of omniscience (LPO) studied in
constructive mathematics ([Bishop and Bridges (1985)]). For historical reasons,
we will denote MLPO2 by LLPO in some cases.
Definition 16. A function
f : {(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ (NN)n | ∃i ≤ n pi = 0N} → {1, 2, . . . , n}
is a realizer of MLPOn, if it fulﬁlls pf(p1,...,pn) = 0
N for all (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ dom(f).
Theorem 17. MLPOn ≡W 1Puren
Proof. First, we present a reduction from MLPOn to 1Puren. The n input
tapes (or the n projections from the product representation) for MLPOn can
individually be translated to the n relevant input tapes for 1Puren. As long as
0 is read, 0 will be printed. If any other number is read in the ith step for the
ﬁrst time, print the number ν−1(−2−i−1) from now on. All tapes containing 0N
will be translated to a ρ-name of 0, and all other tapes to a ρ-name of some
negative number, so a pure equilibrium corresponds to a 0-entry.
For the other direction, all input values have to be compared. As long as no
contradiction for the assumption that the ith value is the largest one has been
found, 0 will be printed on the ith output tape. If contradiction is found, print
1. Then an output tape contains 0N, if and only if the corresponding input tape
contains a ρ-name of a maximal entry.
In the next step, we extend the scope of consideration to ﬁnding pure equi-
libria in arbitrary bi-matrix games. The relevant problems are Purenm, where
the size of the game is restricted to n × m, and the general case (i.e. the co-
product over all n,m ∈ N) denoted by Pure. For obtaining results, reducibility
to MLPOn shall be expressed by a covering property. It involves the notion of
co-r.e.-closed sets. For A ⊆ B ⊆ NN, we call A co-r.e.-closed in B, if there is
a computable function G with B ⊆ dom(G) and A = G−1({0N}) ∩ B. Other
characterizations of co-r.e.-closed sets can be found in [Weihrauch (2000)].
Lemma18. Let f : (X,α) → (Y, β) be a total multi-valued function between
represented spaces. Then f ≤W MLPOn holds, if and only if there is a covering
(Ai)i≤n of α−1(X), so that for each i ≤ n the set Ai is co-r.e.-closed in dom(α),
and f|α(Ai) has a computable realizer.
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Proof. Assume f ≤W MLPOn, so there are computable F , G with
F ◦ 〈id,M ◦G〉  f for all M  MLPOn. Abbreviate Gi := pri ◦G, where pri is
the projection to the ith component. Consider G−1i (0
N)∩dom(α). As Gi is com-
putable, this set is co-r.e.-closed in dom(α). There is a realizer Mi  MLPOn, so
that for x ∈ G−1i (0N)∩dom(α), Mi(G(x)) = i holds. Thus, if F ◦〈id,Mi ◦G〉  f
is restricted to G−1i (0
N) ∩ dom(α), it is equal to F ◦ 〈id, i〉, and therefore it is
computable. As there is an i with Gi(x) = 0
N for each x ∈ dom(α), dom(G) ⊇
dom(α) =
n⋃
i=1
G−1i (0
N) ∩ dom(α) holds, completing the ﬁrst part of the proof.
For the other direction, let dAi witness that Ai is co-r.e.-closed in α
−1(X).
Now consider the computable functionD : α−1(X) → ({0, 1}N)n deﬁned through
D(x)(i) = dAi(x). Further, deﬁne a computable function F on the set
n⋃
i=1
Ai×{i}
through F (x, i) = Ri(x), where Ri is a computable realizer of f|α(Ai). Then
F ◦ 〈id,M ◦D〉  f for each M  MLPOn.
Lemma 18 relativizes, that means that it remains true, if Weihrauch-
reducibility is replaced by continuous Weihrauch-reducibility, co-r.e.-closed is
replaced by closed and computable by continuous.
Theorem 19. Purenm ≤W MLPOn∗m.
Proof. Given an n ×m bi-matrix game (A,B), the condition for the pair (i, j)
to be a pure equilibrium is Aij ≥ Akj and Bij ≥ Bil for all k ≤ n, l ≤ m. This
implies that the set
P ijnm = {(A,B) | (i, j) is an equilibrium of (A,B)} ⊆ Rn×m × Rn×m
is closed. As the condition can be eﬀectively rejected, if false, the set
(ρn×m)−1(P ijnm) is co-r.e.-closed (in dom(ρ
n×m))2. As the set of n×m bi-matrix
games which have some pure equilibrium is the union
⋃
i≤n,j≤m
P ijnm, and the re-
striction of Purenm to any ﬁxed set P
ij
nm is trivially computable, an application
of Lemma 18 yields the claim.
Corollary 20. 1Pure ≡W Pure ≡W
∐
n∈N
MLPOn
Proof. The reductions given in the proofs of Theorems 17 and 19 are uniform in
the dimensions, and so are the trivial reductions involved.
The same reasoning used to establish the equivalence of ﬁnding pure strate-
gies in 1 player games and in 2 player games can directly be extended to any
ﬁnite number of players. While Nash and correlated equilibria have the same
Weihrauch-degree as pure equilibria in single player games, we will continue to
show that a higher Weihrauch-degree emerges in the two player case.
2 As dom(ρn×m) itself is co-r.e. closed in NN, the relativized formulation is not neces-
sary here. However, it is suﬃcient to invoke Lemma 18.
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4 Nash and Correlated Equilibria in Bi-matrix Games
We will now consider Nash and correlated equilibria in bi-matrix games. The
problems Corrnm and Nashnm are the ﬁxed size versions, Corr and Nash the
general problems. Restriction to zero-sum games yields the problems ZCorrnm,
ZNashnm and the corresponding general problems. Straightforward reasoning
yields the reductions:
ZCorrnm ≤W Corrnm ≤W Nashnm , ZCorrnm ≤W ZNashnm ≤W Nashnm
4.1 The Weihrauch-degree of Robust Division
Similar to LLPO (or MLPOn) being representative of the kind of incomputabil-
ity we face when searching for pure equilibria, we will start with considering
division, which will turn out to be typical for correlated and Nash equilibria.
Computing ab given two real numbers a, b = 0 is possible, of course. However,
testing whether b = 0 is not. A robust variant of division, which accepts division
by zero and returns an arbitrary value, is not computable anymore. Alterna-
tively, this problem can be phrased as ﬁnding a zero of a linear function that
admits at least one.
Definition 21. Given two real numbers x, y with 0 ≤ x ≤ y, rDiv returns xy ,
if that number exists, and any real number z with 0 ≤ z ≤ 1 otherwise.
While robust division is only slightly incomputable, as it is reducible to decid-
ing whether a real number is 0 or not, the following theorem shows that robust
division introduces a new kind of incomputability not present in ﬁnding pure
equilibria. Before this, we present a technical detail used in the proof which also
is of independent interest.
Proposition22. The restriction rDiv′ of rDiv to those (x, y) additionally sat-
isfying x, y ≤ 1 is equivalent to rDiv.
Proof. Given a real number y, we can compute some natural upper bound k > 0,
and subsequently also x/k and y/k. If x, y are in the domain of rDiv, then
x/k, y/k are in the domain of rDiv′, and we have rDiv(x, y) = rDiv′(x/k, y/k).
Theorem 23. rDiv cW Pure.
Proof. The proof proceeds by reductio ad absurdum. To this end, we can assume
rDiv′ ≤cW 1Pure, due to Corollary 20 and Proposition 22. This implies the
existence of continuous functions F , G, L so that for each E  1Pure the
function dE deﬁned through dE(u, v) = F (u, v, E(〈L(u, v), G(u, v)〉)) is a realizer
of rDiv′. Here L chooses the size of the game, G gives the game and F uses a
maximal value of the game to derive the result.
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We consider n = L(0N, 0N). As L is continuous, the set L−1({n}) is open and
closed in dom(L), so it contains an open neighbourhood of (0N, 0N). Especially
there is a k ∈ N with dom(L)∩(0kNN×0kNN) ⊆ L−1({n}). We note ρ(u)ρ(v) = ρ(0
ku)
ρ(0kv)
where ν(u(i)) = ν(u(i)) ∗ 2−k−1 and ν(v(i)) = ν(v(i)) ∗ 2−k−1. Thus we obtain
rDiv′ ≤cW 1Puren.
According to the topological version of Lemma 18, rDiv′ ≤cW 1Puren im-
plies the existence of n closed3 sets Ai so that for each i there is an fi  rDiv′
so that fi restricted to Ai is continuous. If there is an l with (0
N, 0N) /∈ Al, then
there is a k ∈ N with (0kNN × 0kNN) ∩ Al = ∅, so with a repetition of the argu-
ment used above we can conclude rDiv′ ≤cW 1Puren−1. Thus we can assume
(0N, 0N) ∈ Al for all l ≤ n.
For l ≤ n+ 1 we deﬁne a sequence (wlk)k∈N of sequences through wlk(i) = 0
for i ≤ k and ν(wlk(i)) = (l2k)−1 for i > k. Furthermore, deﬁne the sequence
(vk)k∈N of sequences through vk(i) = 0 for i ≤ k and ν(vk(i)) = 2−k for i > k.
For each sequence (wlk, vk) there must be an l
′ so that Al′ contains an inﬁnite
subsequence (wlk, vk) of (w
l
k, vk). As there are n + 1 sequences and n sets, the
pigeonhole principle ensures that there is a set Ai containing the sequences
(wl1k , vk) and (w
l2
k , vk).
Now observe lim
k→∞
(wl1k , vk) = limk→∞
(wl2k , vk) = (0
N, 0N), but ρ(fi(w
l1
k , vk)) =
l−11 = l−12 = ρ(fi(wl2k , vk)). Thus, the restriction of fi to Ai is not continuous in
(0N, 0N), yielding a contradiction to the assumption.
We will now use modiﬁcations of the game matching pennies as a gadget
to implement divisions in a game. For real numbers a, b, the game MP (a, b) is
speciﬁed via the following payoﬀ matrices:
A =
(
a 0
0 b
)
, B = −A , MP (a, b) = (A,B)
Theorem 24. rDiv ≤W ZCorr22
Proof. Given a pair of ρ-names for real numbers a, b with 0 ≤ a ≤ b, a name
for the game MP (a, b − a) can be computed. Let C be correlated equilibrium
of MP (a, b − a). We claim c12 + c22 = ab for b > 0. The 4 inequalities from the
deﬁnition of a correlated equilibrium are:
(1) a(c11 + c12) ≥ bc12 (2) bc22 ≥ a(c21 + c22)
(3) a(c12 + c22) ≥ bc22 (4) bc21 ≥ a(c11 + c21)
0 = a < b If a = 0, then (1) and (3) together with b > 0 state c12 = c22 = 0 =
a
b .
3 To be precise, also the fact that (ρ2)−1(dom(rDiv)) is closed is relevant to obtain
that the sets Ai are closed in NN.
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0 < a < b
Combination of the inequalities (1) and (4) yields a(c21− c12) ≤ b(c21− c12),
together with a < b this implies c21 − c12 ≥ 0. Combination of (2) and (3)
yields a(c12 − c21) ≥ 0. Hence, since a > 0, the correlated equilibrium is
symmetric.
Then addition of (1) and (3) yields a ≥ b(c12+ c22), and addition of (2) and
(4) yields b(c12 + c22) ≥ a, hence the claim follows.
0 < a = b 4
Here, (2) and c21 ≥ 0 imply c21 = 0, in the same way (4) and c11 ≥ 0
imply c11 = 0. Thus, we have:
c12 + c22 = c11 + c12 + c21 + c22 = 1 =
a
b
In the case a = b = 0, 0 ≤ c12 + c22 ≤ 1 holds due to the normaliza-
tion requirement for correlated equilibria, hence c12 + c22 is a valid answer to
rDiv(0, 0).
Theorem 24 in conjunction with Theorem 23 implies ZCorr22 cW Pure, so
even the simplest case of ﬁnding mixed strategies is not reducible to ﬁnding pure
strategies. The problem rDiv itself does not capture the discontinuity of ﬁnding
Nash equilibria5, compelling us to move to suitable products, and eventually
rDiv.
4.2 Products of Games
The product of functions can be considered as computing all of them in parallel.
This allows us to specify exactly the Weihrauch-degree of problems solvable by
multiple robust divisions. For games, our notion of a product will be inspired
by the model of playing two independent games at once. This will allow us to
establish a link between products of functions and products of games. We will use
[ ] to denote a bijection between {1, 2, . . . , n}× {1, 2, . . . ,m} and {1, 2, . . . , nm}
for suitable n, m.
Definition 25. Given an n1 ×m1 bi-matrix game (A1, B1) and an n2 ×m2 bi-
matrix game (A2, B2), we deﬁne the (n1n2)× (m1m2) product game (A1, B1)×
(A2, B2) as (A,B) with A[i1,i2][j1,j2] = A
1
i1j1 + A
2
i2j2 and
B[i1,i2][j1,j2] = B
1
i1j1
+B2i2j2 .
4 The author is grateful to a referee for pointing out the necessity and details of this
case.
5 This claim could be shown using the Level introduced in [Hertling (1996)].
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The product of games nicely commutes with the notions from game theory
used in this paper, as will be established by the following theorems. A slight
exception holds for the zero-sum property: A zero-sum game can always be
expressed as the product of two constant-sum games which are not zero-sum.
However, as a constant-sum game can always be normalized to an equivalent
zero-sum game6, this is not problematic for our purposes.
For simplifying notation, in the following theorems and their proofs, (A,B)
always abbreviates (A1, B1)× (A2, B2).
Theorem 26. (A,B) is constant-sum, if and only if both (A1, B1) and (A2, B2)
are constant-sum.
Proof. Assume that (A1, B1) and (A2, B2) are constant-sum, that is Akij+B
k
ij =
ck for k ∈ {1, 2} and all i, j. Then we have
A[i1,i2][j1,j2] +B[i1,i2][j1,j2] = A
1
i1j1 +A
2
i2j2 +B
1
i1j1 +B
2
i2j2 = c
1 + c2
for all i1, i2, j1, j2, so (A,B) is also a constant-sum game.
For the other direction, we assume w.l.o.g. that (A1, B1) is not constant-sum,
so there are i1, j1, k1, l1 with A
1
i1,j1
+B1i1,j1 = A1k1,l1 +B1k1,l1 . Then we have:
A[i1,1],[j1,1] +B[i1,1],[j1,1] = A
1
i1,j1
+B1i1,j1 +A
2
1,1 +B
2
1,1
= A1k1,l1 +B1k1,l1 +A21,1 +B21,1 = A[k1,1],[l1,1] +B[k1,1],[l1,1]
Thus, the product (A,B) is not constant-sum.
Theorem 27. (ik, jk) is a pure equilibrium of (A
k, Bk) for both k ∈ {0, 1}, if
and only if ([i1, i2], [j1, j2]) is a pure equilibrium of (A,B).
Proof. The proof is done by contraposition. Assume w.l.o.g. that iˆ1 is a better
response to j1 than i1, that is A
1
iˆ1,j1
> A1i1,j1 . Then we also have A[ˆi1,i2],[j1,j2] >
A[i1,i2],[j1,j2], so if (i1, j1) is not a pure equilibrium, then ([i1, i2], [j1, j2]) cannot
be one either.
If, on the other hand, [ˆi1, iˆ2] is a better response against [j1, j2] than [i1, i2],
then we have A1
iˆ1,j1
+ A2
iˆ2,j2
> A1i1,j1 + A
2
i2,j2
. Obviously, this contradicts the
conjunction of A1i1,j1 ≥ A1iˆ1,j1 and A
2
i2,j2
≥ A2
iˆ2,j2
.
For our next result, observe that [ , ] : Sn × Sm → Sn∗m deﬁned by
[x1, x2][i,j] = x
1
ix
2
j is a computable bijection, the (also computable) inverse is
obtained via x1i =
∑m
j=1[x
1, x2][i,j] and x
2
j =
∑n
i=1[x
1, x2][i,j].
6 Given a game (A,B), one can compute the game (A′, B′) with A′ij = Aij −A11 and
B′ij = Bij−B11. Due to the linearity of all our solution concepts, (A,B) and (A′, B′)
have exactly the same pure, Nash and correlated equilibria. Furthermore, if (A,B)
was constant-sum, then (A′, B′) is zero-sum.
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Theorem 28. ([x1, x2], [y1, y2]) is a Nash equilibrium of (A,B), if and only if
(xk, yk) is a Nash equilibrium of (Ak, Bk) for both k ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. Central to the proof is the following equality:
(n1n2)∑
i=1
(m1m2)∑
j=1
[x1, x2]iAi,j [y
1, y2]j
=
n1∑
i1=1
n2∑
i2=1
m1∑
j1=1
m2∑
j2=1
[x1, x2][i1,i2]A[i1,i2],[j1,j2][y
1, y2][j1,j2]
=
n1∑
i1=1
n2∑
i2=1
m1∑
j1=1
m2∑
j2=1
x1i1x
2
i2(A
1
i1,j1 +A
2
i2,j2)y
1
j1y
2
j2
=
[
n1∑
i1=1
m1∑
j1=1
x1i1A
1
i1,j1
y1j1
(
n2∑
i2=1
x2i2
)(
m2∑
j2=1
y2j2
)]
+
[
n2∑
i2=1
m2∑
j2=1
x2i2A
2
i2,j2y
2
j2
(
n1∑
i1=1
x1i1
)(
m1∑
j1=1
y1j1
)]
=
[
n1∑
i1=1
m1∑
j1=1
x1i1A
1
i1,j1y
1
j1
]
+
[
n2∑
i2=1
m2∑
j2=1
x2i2A
2
i2,j2y
2
j2
]
Using it, the structure of this proof is identical to that of Theorem 27. Assume
that xˆ1 is a better response against y1 than x1, that is:
n1∑
i=1
m1∑
j=1
xˆ1iA
1
i,jy
1
j >
n1∑
i=1
m1∑
j=1
x1iA
1
i,jy
1
j
Given any strategy proﬁle (x2, y2) in the second game, we can add∑n2
i=1
∑m2
j=1 x
2
iA
2
i,jy
2
j , and apply the transformation above on both sides to ob-
tain:
n1n2∑
i=1
m1m2∑
j=1
[xˆ1, x2]iAi,j [y
1, y2]j >
n1n2∑
i=1
m1m2∑
j=1
[x1, x2]iAi,j [y
1, y2]j
Thus, [xˆ1, x2] is a better response against [y1, y2] than [x1, x2]. By repeating the
argument with the roles of the players exchanged, and then with the order of
the games exchanged, it is demonstrated that if either (x1, y1) or (x2, y2) is not
a Nash equilibrium of the respective game, then ([x1, x2], [y1, y2]) cannot be a
Nash equilibrium of the product game.
If, on the other hand, xk is a best response against yk for both k ∈ {0, 1},
i.e. provides greater-or-equal payoﬀ than all alternatives xˆk, the respective in-
equalities can be added to yield:[
n1∑
i1=1
m1∑
j1=1
x1i1A
1
i1,j1
y1j1
]
+
[
n2∑
i2=1
m2∑
j2=1
x2i2A
2
i2,j2
y2j2
]
≥[
n1∑
i1=1
m1∑
j1=1
xˆ1i1A
1
i1,j1
y1j1
]
+
[
n2∑
i2=1
m2∑
j2=1
xˆ2i2A
2
i2,j2
y2j2
]
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Using again the equivalence transformation outline in the beginning of this
proof, this inequality can be brought into the form:
n1n2∑
i=1
m1m2∑
j=1
[x1, x2]iAi,j [y
1, y2]j ≥
n1n2∑
i=1
m1m2∑
j=1
[xˆ1, xˆ2]iAi,j [y
1, y2]j
The latter inequality is just the condition for [x1, x2] to be a best response
against [y1, y2]. By exchanging the roles of the player, the remaining implication
is shown.
In order to derive an analogous result for correlated equilibria, again a suit-
able homeomorphism is needed. Let Cn,m denote the set of real n×m-matrices
C with non-negative entries and
∑n
i=1
∑m
j=1 Cij = 1. Then a computable homeo-
morphism [ , ] : Cn1,m1 × Cn2,m2 → Cn1n2,m1m2 can be deﬁned via
[C1, C2][i1,i2],[j1,j2] := C
1
i1,j1
C2i2,j2 . The existence and computability of the inverse
follows from C1i1,j1 =
∑n2
i2=1
∑m2
j2=1
[C1, C2][i1,i2],[j1,j2] and
C2i2,j2 =
∑n1
i1=1
∑m1
j1=1
[C1, C2][i1,i2],[j1,j2].
Theorem 29. If [C1, C2] is a correlated equilibrium of (A,B), then Ck is a
correlated equilibrium of (Ak, Bk) for both k ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. Without limitation of generality, we assume that the ﬁrst condition in
Deﬁnition 3 is violated in the ﬁrst game, and show that this implies a violation
in the composed game. Hence, we start with:
m1∑
j1=1
A1i1,j1C
1
i1,j1 <
m1∑
j1=1
A1l1,j1C
1
i1,j1
for some i1, l1. Due to
∑n2
i2=1
∑m2
j2=1
C2i2,j2 = 1, this is equivalent to:
m1∑
j1=1
n2∑
i2=1
m2∑
j2=1
A1i1,j1C
1
i1,j1C
2
i2,j2 <
m1∑
j1=1
n2∑
i2=1
m2∑
j2=1
A1l1,j1C
1
i1,j1C
2
i2,j2
Using the deﬁnitions of A and [C1, C2], and adding identical terms to both sides
for any i2, we arrive at:∑m1
j1=1
∑n2
i2=1
∑m2
j2=1
A[i1,i2],[j1,j2][C
1, C2][i1,i2],[j1,j2]
<
∑m1
j1=1
∑n2
i2=1
∑m2
j2=1
A[l1,i2],[j1,j2][C
1, C2][i1,i2],[j1,j2]
As the inequality holds for the sum over all i2, there has to be some value iˆ2, so
that the following holds:
m1∑
j1=1
m2∑
j2=1
A[i1 ,ˆi2],[j1,j2][C
1, C2][i1 ,ˆi2],[j1,j2] <
m1∑
j1=1
m2∑
j2=1
A[l1,ˆi2],[j1,j2][C
1, C2][i1 ,ˆi2],[j1,j2]
This is the desired contradiction.
2699Pauly A.: How Incomputable is Finding Nash Equilibria?
As the product game can be computed from the constituent games, we can use
the properties of the products of games to obtain the following results regarding
the problem of ﬁnding equilibria:
Theorem 30. Let Game ∈ {Pure,ZCorr,ZNash,Corr,Nash}. Then
〈Gamenm,Gamekl〉 ≤W Game(nk),(ml).
Corollary 31. Let Game ∈ {Pure,ZCorr,ZNash,Corr,Nash}. Then
Game ≡W Game.
Proof. This is a consequence of applying Lemma 14 to Theorem 30.
The present paper contains two results interpretable as counterparts to Theo-
rem 30, as they allow to reduce ﬁnding equilibria for a large game to ﬁnding equi-
libria in several smaller games; for mixed strategies, this will be a consequence
of the main result presented in Subsection 4.3, the corresponding statement for
pure strategies is given in the next theorem:
Theorem 32. MLPOn+1 ≤W LLPOn for n > 1.
Proof. Let  denote the quasi-ordering on NN deﬁned by p  q, if 0M is a preﬁx
of q whenever it is a preﬁx of p for all M ∈ N. On its domain, MLPOn+1 is
the problem of picking an index of a maximal element from n+1 elements with
respect to . Computing a maximum max{p1, . . . , pn+1} is computable. The
order  is total, and the task of picking a true statement from p  q and q  p
is reducible to LLPO: As long as 0s are read from both input tapes, write 0s on
both output tapes. If the ﬁrst 1 is encountered on an input tape, disregard the
rest of the input and write 1s on the corresponding output tape, and 0s on the
other.
Now the preliminaries are in place to describe the reduction from MLPOn+1
to LLPOn. Let p1, . . . , pn+1 denote the input of MLPOn+1. For each k with 1 ≤
k ≤ n, a copy of LLPO is used to pick a true statement out of max{p1, . . . , pk} 
pk+1 and pk+1  max{p1, . . . , pk}.
Let K be the largest number, so that max{p1, . . . , pK}  pK+1 was de-
termined to be true, and 0 if none of these statements was chosen by LLPOn.
We claim that pK+1 is a maximal element, hence K + 1 a correct solution to
MLPOn+1. Assume there was a l with pK+1  pl, but pl  pK+1. The assump-
tion l ≤ K contradicts max{p1, . . . , pK}  pK+1.
So K + 1 < l has to hold. With out limitation of generality, let l be the
smallest counterexample satisfying the constraints. pl  max{p1, . . . , pl−1} has
to be true, otherwise l would have been picked in place of K. Due to minimality
of l, this implies pl  max{p1, . . . , pK+1}. Together with max{p1, . . . , pK} 
pK+1, we arrive at pl  pK+1, a contradiction. Due to exhaustion of alternatives,
pK+1 is maximal.
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Corollary 33. Pure ≡W LLPO.
Proof. Theorem 17 has LLPO ≤W Pure as a special case. LLPO ≤W Pure
follows by Theorem 13 (2). Considering Corollary 31 yields LLPO ≤W Pure.
For the other direction, start with Purenm ≤W MLPOn∗m due to Theorem
19. Theorem 32 then implies Purenm ≤W LLPOn∗m. As the reductions are
uniform, application of the coproduct on both sides yields Pure ≤W LLPO.
As we have identiﬁed LLPO (or MLPO2 or 1Pure2) as the basic building stone
in the Weihrauch-degree of ﬁnding pure strategies, the following theorem will
establish the missing link in the relationship between ﬁnding pure strategies and
multiple robust divisions:
Theorem 34. LLPO <W rDiv.
Proof. rDiv W LLPO has already been proven. To see LLPO ≤W rDiv,
note that there is a computable function turning arbitrary sequences of natural
numbers into ρ-names, so that a sequence is mapped to a ρ-name of 0 if and only
if it is 0N. Thus we can assume that the input of LLPO is given as two ρ-names a,
b of real numbers, with at least one of them being 0. Consider rDiv(|a|, |a|+ |b|).
If this is not a ρ-name of 1, then a must be a ρ-name of 0. If the output is not
a ρ-name of 0, then b must be a ρ-name of 0.
To sum up the results established sofar, we have:
LLPO ≡W 1Pure ≡W Pure <W rDiv ≤W ZCorr
4.3 Problems Reducible to Robust Divisions
The goal of this subsection is to present a way of designing reductions to
rDiv, and, in particular, to present a reduction from Nash. This equivalently
can be considered as the task to design algorithms for a Type-2-Machine capable
of making a ﬁnite number of independent queries to an oracle for rDiv. Due to
Theorems 32, 34 also oracle calls to MLPOn are permitted.
We will start by providing a technical lemma similar to Lemma 18. Using
the lemma, we can prove that the Fourier-Motzkin-algorithm ([Keler (1996)])
for solving systems of linear inequalities can be executed using computable op-
erations and oracle calls to rDiv.
Lemma35. Let f : (X,α) → (Y, β) be a total multi-valued function between
represented spaces. Then f ≤W rDiv holds, if and only if there is a covering
(Ai)i≤n of α−1(X) with some n ∈ N, such that for each i ≤ n the set Ai is
co-r.e.-closed in α−1(X), and f|α(Ai) is Weihrauch-reducible to rDiv.
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Proof. One direction of the implication is trivial. For the other direction, assume
that there are computable functions Ri, Qi for each i ≤ n witnessing f|α(Ai) ≤W
rDiv. Let Qˆi be a computable extension of Qi to dom(α); such an extension
exists for co-r.e. closed sets. Further let D be the computable function deﬁned for
the sets Ai as in the proof to Lemma 18. Deﬁne the functionQ = (D, Qˆ1, . . . , Qˆn)
and R(x, i, y1, . . . , yn) = Ri(x, yi). Both Q and R are computable, and satisfy
R ◦ 〈idX , qˆ ◦ Q〉  f for qˆ  〈MLPOn,rDivn〉, so we have
f ≤W 〈MLPOn,rDivn〉 ≡W rDiv.
Definition 36. The problem BLinIneqnm asks for a vector v ∈ Rm, so that
Av ≤ b holds in addition to 0 ≤ v ≤ 1 (each inequality is to be considered
componentwise), given a matrix A ∈ Rn×m and a vector b ∈ Rn, provided that a
solution exists. For simplicity, we assume that Av ≤ b always contains 0 ≤ v ≤ 1.
The coproduct over all values of n, m is denoted by BLinIneq.
Theorem 37. BLinIneq ≤W rDiv.
Proof. 7 As BLinIneq is a coproduct, it suﬃces to prove BLinIneqnm ≤W
rDiv uniformly for all n,m ∈ N. We begin by describing our version of the
Fourier Motzkin algorithm, while pointing out all the non-computable parts.
Then it is demonstrated how using MLPOn and rDiv is suﬃcient to solve the
non-computable aspects of the algorithm.
We rewrite the given inequalities as ak1v1 ≤ bk −
m∑
i=2
akivi for ak1 ≥ 0 and
−bj+
m∑
i=2
ajivi ≤ −aj1v1 for aj1 ≤ 0, using sign tests8. From this we can obtain
a system of linear inequalities expressing consistency of partial solutions:
For each pair k, j with ak1 ≥ 0 and aj1 ≤ 0, the corresponding inequalities
can be multiplied by −aj1 respective ak1, and then contracted to:
ak1(−bj +
m∑
i=2
ajivi) ≤ −aj1(bk −
m∑
i=2
akivi)
In the second step we treat the variable v2 in the same way, that is we rewrite
the new inequalities as
(ak1aj2 + aj1ak2)v2 ≤ (ak1bj − aj1bk)−
m∑
i=3
(ak1aji − aj1aki)vi
for (ak1aj2 + aj1ak2) ≥ 0 and
−(ak1bj − aj1bk) +
m∑
i=3
(ak1aji − aj1aki)vi ≤ (ak1aj2 + aj1ak2)v2
7 Recently Vasco Brattka suggested to the author that results from
[Brattka et al. (2010)] might be employed to simplify this proof.
8 Mirroring the deﬁnition of LLPO, the sign of 0 shall be non-deterministically either
0 or 1.
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for (ak1aj2+aj1ak2) ≤ 0. Here we encounter additional sign-tests. As before, a
system of linear inequalities for the consistency of partial assignments to vi for
i > 2 is obtained.
This process is iterated (which includes more sign-tests), until vm is reached.
Hence, we have inequalities aˆkvm ≤ bˆk and cˆl ≤ dˆlvm with aˆk, dˆl ≥ 0. The values
aˆk, bˆk, cˆl, dˆl are all obtained as constant-free polynomial expressions with degree
m from the values aij and bj.
In order to pick a suitable value for vm, we assume we knew the order of
the values aˆk and dˆl. We want to assume 0 ≤ aˆ1 ≤ dˆ1 ≤ aˆ2 ≤ dˆ2 ≤ . . .. The
internal order in each sequence can be obtained by renumbering the elements. In
order to assure that aˆk’s and dˆl’s alternate, additional inequalities of the form
aˆkvm ≤ aˆk and 0 ≤ dˆlvm may be inserted. Additionally, we assume 0 ≤ bˆk ≤ aˆk
and 0 ≤ cˆl ≤ dˆl. As we require 0 ≤ vm ≤ 1, this is unproblematic and can be
ensured by replacing bˆk by max(0,min(aˆk, bˆk)) and cˆl by max(min(cˆl, dˆl), 0).
Now we iteratively pick values vτm satisfying the ﬁrst 2τ inequalities each,
starting with v0m = 1 and continuing with:
vτm = max
(
rDiv(cˆτ , dˆτ ),min
(
rDiv(bˆτ , aˆτ ), v
τ−1
m
))
As long as aˆτ > 0, dˆτ > 0 holds, it can be easily veriﬁed that this assignment is
valid, provided that all the inequalities indeed have a common solution. Due to
the order imposed, aˆτ = 0 implies aˆσ = dˆσ = 0 for all σ < τ , hence any value
would be a valid assignment to the ﬁrst 2τ − 2 inequalities; so the arbitrary
value returned by rDiv(bˆτ , aˆτ ) is unproblematic. The same argument works for
rDiv(cˆτ , dˆτ ).
In the standard Fourier Motzkin algorithm, the value obtained for vm would
now be inserted in the inequalities containing only vm−1 and vm, allowing to use
the same technique to determine a value for vm−1, by iterating, this solves the
initial system of linear inequalities. This way is not available for our purpose,
though, because the input in any call of rDiv must never depend on the result
of another call of rDiv.
Instead, sort all the inequalities containing only the variables vm−1 and vm in
order of increasing absolute value of the larger coeﬃcient of a variable (ordering,
again). Consider the inequality avm−1 ≤ bvm + c with a, b ≥ 0. If a ≥ b, it can
be turned into a constraint for vm−1:
vm−1 ≤ rDiv(b, a)vm + sg(c)rDiv(min(a, |c|), a)
Here sg denotes the sign-operation. The cutoﬀ for c is valid due to the restric-
tion 0 ≤ vm−1 ≤ 1. The variable vm does not appear inside rDiv, so all the
oracle calls can be processed. As before, the constraints for vm−1 are built up
to the ﬁnal expression using appropriately nested max and min operators. The
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other assignment of signs for a and b are dealt with accordingly (sign-tests are
necessary).
However, in the case b ≥ a (sign-test for b−a), we cannot obtain a constraint
for vm−1, as division of b by a is no longer permitted. We, however, introduce
the inequality as another constraint to vm in form of:
rDiv(a, b)vm−1 − sg(c)rDiv(min(b, |c|), b) ≤ vm
The problematic aspect entailed by this is that now the expressions for vm−1
and vm depend on each other. To the extent that the values of the variables
are determined by the system of inequalities this is unproblematic, but the non-
determinism introduced by division by 0 has to be contained. For this, each
occurrence of vm in the constraints for vm−1 is replaced by a pointer to those
constraints for vm with smaller (ordering) denominators, and vice versa.
In both cases it is suﬃcient to insert the max-min-expression for the other
variable obtained from the constraints with smaller denominators, rather than
the ﬁnal expression (which would lead to a circular deﬁnition anyway). If the
denominator in the inequality under consideration is 0, then the result of the
transformation is meaningless, and due to the nested max and min operators,
can be ignored anyway. If the denominator is positive, then all the inﬂuence of
arbitrary results of division by 0 on the other variable are taken into considera-
tion through this constraint. The non-arbitrary inﬂuence of the other inequalities
containing both variables is already included in the contracted set of inequalities
including only one variable.
When extending the procedure outlined above to three and more variables
(which includes more sign-tests and more ordering), two aspects have to be
considered. First, if a new constraint is obtained for a variable which has a
smaller denominator than a constraint from a previous computation where this
variable occurs, the corresponding pointer will include the new constraint as
well. Second, it is no longer safe to assume that |c/a| ≤ 1 for a > 0, where a is
the largest coeﬃcient of a variable, and c is the additive term in the inequality. If
there are k+1 variables in the inequality, it is safe to assume |c/a| ≤ k, though,
as a larger value could not be balanced by the remaining terms. Thus, the call
rDiv(min(a, |c|), a) is replaced by k ∗ rDiv(min(a, |c/k|), a).
Once this procedure is completed, all the calls to rDiv can be evaluated, and
the results are then combined to yield the ﬁnal values for the variables; which
by construction fulﬁll the initial set of inequalities, if these admit a solution.
It remains only to discuss the occurring problems:
Sign-test In all occurrences of this problem we need to know the sign of a
value that is obtained as a constant-free polynomial with degree bounded
by m applied to the original input values. For each input size there are only
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ﬁnitely many of these polynomial expressions. Provided that all other prob-
lems are resolved, for any vector of signs for these expressions, the restriction
of BLinIneqnm to those inputs inducing these signs (which is a closed set) is
reducible to rDiv. The corresponding name sets form a co-r.e.-closed cover
as in Lemma 35, which in turn implies the reducibility to rDiv.
Informally, the main algorithm is executed with all potential results for the
signs, which are obtained in parallel by an oracle call to LLPOk. In the end,
the signs are used to determine the run of the algorithm operating with
correct data.
Ordering The situation here is similar to the one for sign-tests: All involved
values are obtained as constant-free polynomials with degrees bounded by
m applied to the original input values, hence there is only a ﬁnite number
of potential orderings. Each ﬁxed ordering induced a co-r.e.-closed subset of
the domain of BLinIneqnm, which all together satisfy the requirements of
Lemma 35.
Robust Division Obviously oracle calls to rDiv are the solution here.
As the problem BLinIneq is of considerable interest on its own, we shall
note that the converse statement to Theorem 37 is also true:
Theorem 38. rDiv ≤W BLinIneq.
Proof. We have to show rDivn ≤W BLinIneq uniformly for n ∈ N. Given n
pairs of reals (pi, qi), consider the system of linear equalities given by Aii = qi,
Aij = 0 for i = j and bi = pi. The only solutions are given by vi = piqi for qi > 0,
and arbitrary values for those vj with qj = 0. By replacing every equality with
two inequalities, the needed reduction is found.
By adapting [von Stengel (2007), Algorithm 3.4] and applying Lemma 35 and
Theorem 37 we proceed to prove the main theorem of this subsection.
Theorem 39. Nash ≤W rDiv.
Proof. It suﬃces to show Nashnm ≤W rDiv uniformly in n,m ∈ N.
By the best response condition [von Stengel (2007), Proposition 3.1], a pair
of mixed strategies (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium of a game if each pure strategy
played with positive probability in x (in y) is a best response against y (against
x). This condition can be formalized by noting that the following set is the set
of games and their Nash equilibria with support in I, J :
GˆI,J =
{(A,B, x, y) ∈ Rn×m × Rn×m × Sn × Sm | ∀j, k ∈ J ∀l /∈ J
(xTB)j = (x
TB)k ≥ (xTB)l ∧ yl = 0
∀i, p ∈ I ∀q /∈ I (Ay)i = (Ay)p ≥ (Ay)q ∧ xq = 0}
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The set of names of elements in GˆI,J is co-r.e.-closed, and so is the set of names
of the projection
GI,J = {(A,B) | ∃x, y ∈ Sn × Sm (A,B, x, y) ∈ GˆI,J}
since Sn×Sm is computably compact. Now consider Nashnm restricted to GI,J .
Given (A,B) ∈ GI,J , solving a system of linear inequalities is suﬃcient to obtain
(x, y) with (A,B, x, y) ∈ GˆI,J ; hence this restriction is reducible to BLinIneq,
and by Theorem 37 reducible to rDiv.
This establishes that the conditions of Lemma 35 are fulﬁlled. Its application
yields Nashnm ≤W rDiv.
Corollary 40. ZCorr ≡W Corr ≡W ZNash ≡W Nash ≡W rDiv.
The same technique applied in the proof of Theorem 37 could also be used
to show that Gaussian Elimination can be reduced to rDiv. This would show
that the reduction of Gaussian Elimination to the rank of a matrix given in
[Ziegler and Brattka (2004)] is strict, taking into consideration the results of
Subsection 5.1.
5 Additional Results
5.1 Placing Robust Division in the Weihrauch-hierarchy
We proceed to place rDiv (and subsequently rDiv) in the fragment of the
Weihrauch-hierarchy outlined in [Brattka and Gherardi (2009a), Figure 1]. This
will allow us to derive some interesting properties of Nash as consequences
of general results. One problem relevant for the comparison is BI , which has
an increasing sequence (ln)n∈N and a decreasing sequence (rm)m∈N of ratio-
nal numbers with limn→∞ ln ≤ limm→∞ rm as input, and real numbers x with
limn→∞ ln ≤ x ≤ limm→∞ rm as solutions. The other one is B−I , the restriction
of BI to the sequences with limn→∞ ln < limm→∞ rm.
Theorem 41. rDiv ≤W BI .
Proof. The reduction from rDiv to BI is straightforward: While the machine
searches for some n ∈ N with 1n ≤ y on input x, y, it prints (0, 1). If such a
lower bound is found, xy can be computed, that is we can compute an increasing
sequence (li)i∈N ∈ Q and an decreasing sequence (ri)i∈N ∈ Q with lim
i→∞
li =
x
y =
lim
i→∞
ri. In this case, said sequences serve as input to BI .
Theorem 42. B−I 
c
W rDiv.
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Proof. The separation follows from considerations of the Level of the involved
problems. Following [Hertling (1996)], we introduce the following sets for a func-
tion F on Baire space:
L0(F ) = dom(F )
Lα+1(F ) = {x ∈ Lα(F ) | F|Lα(F ) is discontinuous in x}
Lγ(F ) =
⋂
α<γ
Lα(F ) for limit ordinals γ
The Level of a multi-valued function f between represented spaces is the small-
est ordinal α, so that there is a realizer F  f with Lα(F ) = ∅. As shown in
[Hertling (1996), Korollar 2.4.3], the Level is non-increasing under Weihrauch-
reducibility (this result was extended to multi-valued functions in [Pauly (2010)]),
including the case of non-existent Level.
The Level of rDiv is ω0, the smallest inﬁnite ordinal, as can be veriﬁed by
straightforward calculation. The Level of B−I does not exist, as every realizer
of B−I is discontinuous in every point of its domain: Assume that the realizer
returns a ρ-name of x given the input (li)i∈N, (ri)i∈N. Either limi→∞ li < x
or x < limi→∞ ri holds, w.l.o.g. assume the former. Then there is a rational q
with limi→∞ li < q < x. For any K ∈ N, deﬁne the sequence rK by rKk = rk
for k ≤ K, and rKk = q otherwise. Each neighbourhood of (l, r) contains some
(l, rK), at which no value y with d(x, y) < d(x, q) is a valid solution.
Corollary 43. Every computable bi-matrix game has a computable Nash equi-
librium.
Proof. It is easy to verify that the existence of a computable solution for each
computable instance, i.e. non-uniform computability of the problem, is
downwards-preserved by Weihrauch-reducibility. The non-uniform computabil-
ity of BI was observed in [Brattka and Gherardi (2009a)]; the claim then follows
via Theorem 41.
Corollary 44. If the task of finding Nash equilibria is restricted to games with
a unique equilibrium, it becomes computable.
Proof. As shown in [Brattka and Gherardi (2009a)], BI is weakly computable (in
the sense of [Brattka and Gherardi (2009b)]), so by Theorem 41, rDiv is weakly
computable. A straightforward proof shows that rDiv, Nash and the restric-
tion of Nash to games with unique equilibria inherit the weak computability.
The latter is a single-valued function into a computable metric space, so due
to [Brattka and Gherardi (2009b), Corollary 8.8], weak computability already
implies computability here.
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There is a result closely related to the special case of the last corollary for
2× 2-games in Constructive Mathematics. In [Bridges (2004)] it is shown that if
a 2× 2-bimatrix game has at most one Nash equilibrium, then it constructively
has a Nash equilibrium.
5.2 Elimination of Dominated Strategies
A conceptually simpler (partial) solution concept for games is given by (iterated)
elimination of dominated strategies. Following [Kalai and Zemel (1988)], three
concepts of dominance9 in bi-matrix games are distinguished.
Definition 45.
– A strategy i weakly dominates a strategy j, if for all k Aik ≥ Ajk.
– A strategy i dominates a strategy j, if for all k Aik ≥ Ajk and there is a k0
satisfying Aik0 > Ajk0 .
– A strategy i strictly dominates a strategy j, if for all k Aik > Ajk.
Analogous deﬁnitions are assumed for column-player’s strategies. As remov-
ing a strategy can induce new dominations, it makes sense to deﬁne iterated
elimination, where dominated strategies are removed until no dominations re-
main. For more detailed deﬁnitions and the computational complexity of the
associated problems in the classical model, we refer to [Pauly (2009a)].
The basic building block we will use to classify the Weihrauch-degrees occur-
ring here is the problem LPO [Weihrauch (1992b)] deﬁned as follows:
Definition 46. LPO is the problem of deciding whether a real number is 0 or
not.
Considering games where the second player has only one action available
already allows to state some basic results about the occurring kinds of incom-
putability. In this case, dominance and strict dominance coincide, and one round
of elimination is already suﬃcient to obtain a completely reduced subgame. Iter-
ated elimination of weakly dominated strategies simply requires to determine an
index corresponding to a maximal entry, so it turns out to be the same problem
as ﬁnding Nash or pure equilibria.
Elimination of (strictly) dominated strategies, however, means that instead
of returning an index of a maximal value, we have to return all indices corre-
sponding to maximal values. This problem is equivalent to LPOn, where n is the
9 Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a consensus in the literature how to name
the diﬀerent concepts of dominance. The concept of dominance is sometimes referred
to as weak dominance, while our weak dominance sometimes is called very weak
dominance.
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size of the game, or, if any size is allowed, to LPO. Thus, in the special case of
just one action available for the second player, elimination of weakly dominated
strategies is strictly less incomputable as elimination of (strictly) dominated
strategies.
Given access to a LPO-oracle, one can ask whether any pair of payoﬀ val-
ues is equal, or which one is bigger. With this information, it is clearly possible
to compute the remaining game after repeated elimination of (strictly) domi-
nated strategies. Therefore, considering any bi-matrix game does not increase
the Weihrauch-degree for dominance or strict dominance.
Extending iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies to non-trivial
bi-matrix games, however, increases the incomputability, as can be demonstrated
by the following gadget:
Example 1. Given a real number x, let Ex be the following game:
A =
(
x 0
0 x
)
B = −A
Clearly, for x = 0, Ex is a case of the game matching pennies, and already
completely reduced under elimination of weakly dominated strategies. For x = 0,
however, the reduced form of E0 is A = (0), B = (0).
With this example, we have a reduction from LPO to iterated elimination of
weakly dominated strategies. By using the product structure of games, one can
prove that also iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies is equivalent
to LPO.
As we have demonstrated that the iterated elimination of (weakly/strictly)
dominated strategies is even less computable than ﬁnding Nash equilibria, none
of the three variants of dominance is suitable for e.g. pre-processing from this
point of view.
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